Hybrid security risk management plan

33 minutes to read - 30 March 2023

This Security Risk Management Plan (SRMP) has been developed to demonstrate the reduction in risk that can be achieved by implementing the HybridSystem to secure access to Microsoft Office 365 services from Windows 10 endpoints and iOS mobile devices.

Each risk has been assessed in the context of the controls implemented by the HybridSystem directly, those implemented by Microsoft as part of the Office 365 service, as well as those that are expected to be implemented by organisations that will leverage the HybridSystem. The risk matrix, including definitions of likelihood and consequence, is provided at Risk Matrix. Organisations leveraging the HybridSystem should review the risk ratings and align them to their internal risk management framework as applicable.

The residual risk to the organisation has been assessed as Medium. This can be further reduced to Medium-Low by implementing the additional treatments detailed in this document. It is an organisation’s responsibility to accept the risks and associated residual risk rating as described within this document.

A summary of the identified risks and the assessed risk ratings are listed in Table 1.

Table 1 Summary of Risk Events and Risk Ratings

Risk Event ID	Risk Event Description	Inherent Risk Rating	Residual Risk Rating	Target Risk Rating
R01	Inadequate privileged account management	High	Medium	Low
R02	Sensitive/classified email sent to unauthorised recipients	High	Medium	Medium
R03	Unauthorised access to data hosted within Office 365	High	Medium	Medium
R04	Malicious insider disables security capabilities	Medium	Medium	Medium
R05	Unskilled administrator misconfigures services	Medium	Medium	Low
R06	Components infected by malicious code	High	Medium	Low
R07	Unauthorised access to email on Exchange Online	High	Medium	Medium
R08	Denial of service attacks	High	Medium	Low
R09	Cyber security incident not detected	High	Medium	Medium
R10	Inability to recover from a data loss event	Medium	Low	Low
R11	Operating System vulnerability allows exploitation	High	Medium	Medium
R12	Application vulnerability allows exploitation	High	Medium	Medium
R13	Attacker bypasses application control capability	High	Low	Low
R14	Password spray attack directed at Azure AD	High	Medium	Medium
R15	Lack of availability due to cloud service provider outage	Medium	Low	Low
R16	Privileged Access Workstations not implemented for administration	High	Medium	Medium
R17	Mobile device compromised	High	High	High
R18	Use of un-assessed cloud services creates exposures	High	Medium	Medium
R19	Users declassifying emails without the owner’s permission	High	Medium	Medium
R20	Compromise of the Azure AD Connect database	Medium	Medium	Medium
R21	Compromise of the SharePoint database	Medium	Medium	Medium

Introduction

This Security Risk Management (SRMP) has been prepared to support organisations planning to leverage the HybridSystem. The document demonstrates the controls implemented by the HybridSystem that reduce the risk of leveraging Office 365 up to and including PROTECTED security classified information.

PROTECTED is used thought the document to describe the maximum security classification of information able to be managed by the system. Where PROTECTED is used, the security markings described by the Protective Security Policy Framework (PSPF) such as OFFICIAL and OFFICIAL: Sensitive are inferred.

Purpose

The purpose of this SRMP is to identify the risks and the residual risk to an organisation implementing the HybridSystem.

Scope

The scope of this SRMP is limited to those threats and risks specific to the use of Office 365 as part of the HybridSystem.

The Microsoft Office 365 service is addressed in the Information Security Registered Assessors Program (IRAP) report (available in the Service Trust Portal), therefore, risks specific to the underlying Office 365 service are not reassessed by this SRMP.

Organisations should make themselves aware of any risks identified in the IRAP assessment that have been inherited by the HybridSystem.

Methodology

The assessment of the threats and risks presented in this SRMP has been performed in accordance with industry best practice in line with AS/NZS ISO 31000:2009. The risk matrix that was used in the assessment of risk ratings is included in Risk Matrix.

Risk assessment

Detailed assessment of the risks to the operation of the system are outlined in the following sections which demonstrate the controls required to manage risks within the solution. All risk ratings have been updated to align with the risk matrix identified in Risk Matrix.

R01 Inadequate privileged account management

Risk overview

If a privileged account were to be compromised or system privileges were incorrectly assigned, the environment could be accessed by staff without a legitimate need to know. Once inside, the unauthorised user could use the account to make malicious changes, such as the addition, alteration or deletion of data. Depending on the nature of the account used, the unauthorised user could bring down the environment.

Assets affected

All infrastructure (Azure AD, Office 365, on-premises servers, and endpoints)

Threat sources

Adversarial – Individual – Trusted Insider, Insider, Outsider
Unintentional – Organisation system administrator

Threat events

Obtain unauthorised access to:
Deny access to Organisation information to authorised users
Modify Organisation information and making the integrity of the information unavailable or no longer trustworthy
Obfuscate adversary actions
Obtain information by opportunistically stealing or scavenging information systems/components
Compromise organisational information systems to facilitate exfiltration of data/information
Obtain sensitive and or classified information via exfiltration

Inherent likelihood

3 – Possible

Inherent consequence

3 – Moderate

Inherent risk rating

3 – High

Ongoing and completed treatments

Organisation treatments
Organisation IT Security Policy for authorised staff to not provide privileged access to unauthorised staff and not allow logging in using service accounts
Administrative break glass accounts will only be utilised when no other privileged account can be utilised
Approval process to obtain a privileged user account
Training to Organisation nominated system administrators
HybridSystem treatments
Conditional Access enforces Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) for all privileged users
Azure AD Identity Protection enabled to alert on detected User and Sign-in risks
Azure AD Privileged Identity Management (PIM) provides Just-In-Time (JIT) privileged access
Leverages built-in Azure AD / Office 365 Role Groups to implement a robust Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) model
All Azure AD and Office 365 logs are centralised into a single Log Analytics workspace
Emergency access accounts are configured in accordance with Microsoft best practice to prevent administrators from being locked-out of Azure services
Defender for Identity monitors Active Directory authentications and performs User and Entity Behaviour Analytics (UEBA)

Residual likelihood

1 – Rare

Residual consequence

3 – Moderate

Residual risk rating

2 – Medium

Proposed treatments

An annual audit of privileged accounts is performed by the Organisation leveraging Azure AD access reviews
Forward logs to a Security Information and Event Management (SIEM) solution
Administrator training provided for specific technologies utilised within the HybridSystem
Organisation training for security and system administrators for the use of Security Centre / Sentinel
Monitoring of events within Security Centre / Sentinel
Managed Service Accounts (MSAs), including group MSAs (gMSAs), are used where supported
Privileged accounts are added to the “Protected Users” security group

Target likelihood

1 – Rare

Target consequence

2 – Minor

Target risk rating

1 – Low

R02 Sensitive/classified email sent to unauthorised recipients

Risk overview

A user sends an OFFICIAL: Sensitive or PROTECTED classified mail/attachment, or personal information (as defined by the Privacy Act 1988) to an unauthorised recipient resulting in a data spill.

Assets affected

OFFICIAL: Sensitive and PROTECTED data
Personal information

Threat sources

Adversarial – Individual – Insider, Trusted Insider, Privileged Insider
Unintentional – General user

Threat events

Cause disclosure by spilling sensitive and or classified information to a system and or person not authorised to view or handle the information

Inherent likelihood

4 – Likely

Inherent consequence

3 – Moderate

Inherent risk rating

3 – High

Ongoing and completed treatments

Organisation treatments
All email transits via a gateway mail server which enforces email security classification label checking
User awareness training to staff
HybridSystem treatments
Microsoft Information Protection (MIP) requires users to apply a classification marking to all emails and documents
The sensitivity and classification markings from the PSPF for up-to PROTECTED are configured as MIP sensitivity labels
Data transfer logs are retained

Residual likelihood

2 – Unlikely

Residual consequence

3 – Moderate

Residual risk rating

2 – Medium

Proposed treatments

Implement an automated security classification labelling solution for emails based on the classification of attachments
Data spill processes and procedures are developed and regularly tested

Target likelihood

1 – Rare

Target consequence

3 – Moderate

Target risk rating

2 – Medium

R03 Unauthorised access to data hosted within Office 365

Risk overview

An unauthorised user attempts to access data hosted within Microsoft’s Office 365 cloud services, including Exchange Online, OneDrive for Business, SharePoint Online, and Teams to gain access to PROTECTED data. The attacker may attempt to use either stolen or guessed credentials or attempt to introduce malicious code into one or more Office 365 services.

Assets affected

PROTECTED data within the tenant

Threat sources

Adversarial – Individual – Insider, Trusted Insider, Privileged Insider (including Microsoft support staff)
Adversarial – Individual – Outsider
Adversarial – Group – Established
Adversarial – Nation State

Threat events

Compromise organisational information systems to facilitate exfiltration of data/information
Obtain sensitive and or classified information via exfiltration
Obtain unauthorised access to:
Deny access to Organisation information to authorised users
Modify Organisation information and making the integrity of the information unviable or no longer trustworthy

Inherent likelihood

3 – Possible

Inherent consequence

3 – Moderate

Inherent risk rating

3 – High

Ongoing and completed treatments

Native Office 365 treatments
Office 365 services IRAP assessed up to a PROTECTED level
All Office 365 traffic is protected using Transport Layer Security (TLS)
Exchange Online Protection (EOP) provides built in protection for Exchange Online mailboxes
Microsoft’s Cyber Defence Operations Centre helps protect, detect, and respond to Office 365 cloud service threats in real time
HybridSystem treatments
Password complexity is enforced in line with Information Security Manual (ISM) standards, and users are required to change passwords on first use
Conditional Access enforces MFA for all users and administrators
Office 365 audit logging enabled to provide the ability to audit actions undertaken within the Office 365 services
Microsoft Defender for Office 365 Safe Links, Safe Attachments, Safe Documents, and Anti-Phishing capabilities enabled to reduce the likelihood of malicious code infiltrating the environment
Defender for Identity monitors Active Directory authentications and performs User and Entity Behaviour Analytics (UEBA)
Microsoft Defender for Cloud Apps enabled and app connectors and policies configured to detect risky behaviours, violations, or suspicious data points and activities within Office 365
Sender Policy Framework (SPF), Domain based Message Authentication, Reporting and Conformance (DMARC), and DomainKeys Identified Mail (DKIM) records are configured to mitigate spoofing of emails being sent into the organisation
Office 365 services are only utilised within Australian regions
Credential Guard is enabled and credential theft is blocked through Microsoft Defender Exploit Guard
Pass-through Authentication (PTA) is used with Azure AD Connect for authentication
Data transfer logs are retained

Residual likelihood

2 – Unlikely

Residual consequence

2 – Minor

Residual risk rating

2 – Medium

Proposed treatments

None

Target likelihood

2 – Unlikely

Target consequence

2 – Minor

Target risk rating

2 – Medium

R04 Malicious insider disables security capabilities

Risk overview

A malicious insider attempts to disable cloud-based security capabilities (e.g., Azure MFA) increasing the risk of further exploitation.

Assets affected

All cloud-based infrastructure

Threat sources

Adversarial – Individual – Trusted Insider, Insider, or Privileged Insider

Threat events

Functionality of security features are reduced or disabled
Level of security monitoring is limited or disabled
Allow malicious activity to be undetected

Inherent likelihood

2 – Unlikely

Inherent consequence

3 – Moderate

Inherent risk rating

2 – Medium

Ongoing and completed treatments

HybridSystem treatments
Azure AD Identity Protection enabled to alert on detected User and Sign-in risks
Azure AD PIM provides JIT privileged access
Leverages built-in Azure AD / Office 365 Role Groups to implement a robust RBAC model
Microsoft 365 audit logging is enabled
All Azure AD and Office 365 logs are centralised into a single Log Analytics workspace
Attack Surface Reduction rules are enabled for Windows 10 and Office 365 in accordance with ACSC guidance

Residual likelihood

1 – Rare

Residual consequence

3 – Moderate

Residual risk rating

2 – Medium

Proposed treatments

Forward logs to a SIEM solution
Organisation training for security and system administrators for the use of Security Centre
Monitoring of events within Security Centre

Target likelihood

1 – Rare

Target consequence

3 – Moderate

Target risk rating

2 – Medium

R05 Unskilled administrator misconfigures services

Risk overview

An authorised administrator misconfigures services increasing the risk of further exploitation. This may be due to a misunderstanding of the functionality of specific Azure or Office 365 service due to a lack of training or insufficient procedural documentation.

Assets affected

All infrastructure (Azure AD, Office 365, on-premises servers, and endpoints)

Threat sources

Accidental – Privileged User/Administrator

Threat events

Functionality of security features are reduced
Level of security monitoring is limited

Inherent likelihood

3 – Possible

Inherent consequence

2 – Minor

Inherent risk rating

2 – Medium

Ongoing and completed treatments

HybridSystem treatments
Azure AD Identity Protection enabled to alert on detected User and Sign-in risks
Azure AD PIM provides JIT privileged access
Leverages built-in Azure AD / Office 365 Role Groups to implement a robust RBAC model
Microsoft 365 audit logging is enabled
Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) are provided for administrators

Residual likelihood

2 – Unlikely

Residual consequence

2 – Minor

Residual risk rating

2 – Medium

Proposed treatments

Administrator training provided for specific technologies utilised within the HybridSystem
Forward logs to a SIEM solution
Organisation training for security and system administrators for the use of Security Centre
Monitoring of events within Security Centre

Target likelihood

1 – Rare

Target consequence

1 – Minimal

Target risk rating

1 – Low

R06 Components infected by malicious code

Risk overview

Malicious code introduced to the environment by one or more vectors leading to the loss of availability or integrity of the solution.

Assets affected

All infrastructure (Azure AD, Office 365, on-premises servers, and endpoints)

Threat sources

Adversarial – Individual – Insider, Trusted Insider, Privileged Insider
Adversarial – Individual – Outsider
Adversarial – Group – Established
Adversarial – Nation State

Threat events

Deliver known malicious to internal organisational information systems (e.g. virus via email including spam, whaling, spear phishing etc.)
Deliver modified malicious code to internal organisational information systems
Deliver targeted malicious for control of internal systems and exfiltration of data
Insert untargeted malicious into downloadable software and/or into commercial information technology products
Email contains unknown (zero day) exploit which is undetected by Microsoft security systems and delivered to the user

Inherent likelihood

4 – Likely

Inherent consequence

3 – Moderate

Inherent risk rating

3 – High

Ongoing and completed treatments

Native Office 365 treatments
Exchange Online Protection provides built-in protection for Exchange Online mailboxes
Microsoft’s Cyber Defence Operations Centre helps protect, detect, and respond to Office 365 cloud service threats in real time
HybridSystem treatments
Microsoft Defender Antivirus provides signature and heuristic-based detection
Controlled folder access configured to prevent unauthorised applications to writing to specified directories
Microsoft Defender for Endpoint is enabled to provide reporting, pre-breach protection, post-breach detection, automation, and response on Windows 10 endpoints
Microsoft Defender for Office 365 Safe Links, Safe Attachments, Safe Documents, and Anti-Phishing capabilities enabled to reduce the likelihood of malicious code infiltrating the environment
Defender for Identity monitors Active Directory authentications and performs UEBA
Windows Defender Application Control (WDAC) provides application control functionality to block unauthorised executables from running
Windows Defender Exploit Guard (WDEG) ‘exploit protection’ feature is enabled
Hardening of Windows 10 endpoints including application control in accordance with ACSC guidance
Attack Surface Reduction rules are enabled for Windows 10 and Office 365 in accordance with ACSC guidance
Early Launch Antimalware (ELAM), Secure Boot and Trusted Boot are enabled as part of the Windows 10 SOE
Data transfer logs are retained

Residual likelihood

2 – Unlikely

Residual consequence

2 – Minor

Residual risk rating

2 – Medium

Proposed treatments

Forward logs to a SIEM solution
Organisation training for security and system administrators for the use of Security Centre
Monitoring of events within Security Centre

Target likelihood

1 – Rare

Target consequence

2 – Minor

Target risk rating

1 – Low

R07 Unauthorised access to email on Exchange Online

Risk overview

An unauthorised user attempts to access email within mailboxes hosted in Exchange Online which may expose sensitive and or security classified data. This may be attempted using leaked or guessed credentials, or by attempting to intercept legitimate authentication traffic in transit.

Assets affected

Sensitive and or security classified data

Threat sources

Adversarial – Individual – Insider, Trusted Insider, Privileged Insider
Adversarial – Individual – Outsider
Adversarial – Group – Established
Adversarial – Nation State

Threat events

Compromise organisational information systems to facilitate exfiltration of data/information
Obtain security classified and or sensitive information via exfiltration
Obtain unauthorised access to:
Deny access to Organisation information to authorised users
Modify Organisation information and making the integrity of the information unviable or no longer trustworthy
Commit CEO fraud and or Business Email Compromise (BEC)

Inherent likelihood

3 – Possible

Inherent consequence

3 – Moderate

Inherent risk rating

3 – High

Ongoing and completed treatments

HybridSystem treatments
Password complexity is enforced in line with ISM standards, and users are required to change passwords on first use
Conditional Access enforces MFA for all users and administrators
Conditional Access blocks access to Office 365 from external networks
Service provider networks are segregated from Organisation networks through the use of a Secure Internet Gateway (SIG)
Legacy authentication blocked via Conditional Access policies
Credential Guard is enabled and credential theft is blocked through Microsoft Defender Exploit Guard
PTA is used with Azure AD Connect for authentication
Data transfer logs are retained

Residual likelihood

1 – Rare

Residual consequence

3 – Moderate

Residual risk rating

2 - Medium

Proposed treatments

Forward logs to a SIEM solution
Organisation training for security and system administrators for the use of Security Centre
Monitoring of events within Security Centre

Target likelihood

1 – Rare

Target consequence

3 – Moderate

Target risk rating

2 – Medium

R08 Denial of service attacks

Risk overview

An external attacker attempts to disrupt availability by launching a Denial of Service (DoS) attack targeting one or more public facing IP addresses (including Microsoft services).

Assets affected

All infrastructure (Azure AD, Office 365, on-premises servers, and endpoints)
Organisation gateway (if utilised)

Threat sources

Adversarial – Individual – Outsider
Adversarial – Group – Established
Adversarial – Nation State

Threat events

Conduct simple DoS attacks
Conduct Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks
Conduct targeted DoS attacks

Inherent likelihood

4 – Likely

Inherent consequence

3 – Moderate

Inherent risk rating

3 – High

Ongoing and completed treatments

Organisation treatments
Basic DoS protection is available within the Organisation gateway
Native Microsoft treatments
Microsoft provide an underlying denial-of-service defense strategy for Microsoft 365

Residual likelihood

2 – Unlikely

Residual consequence

2 – Minor

Residual risk rating

2 – Medium

Proposed treatments

Enhance DoS/DDoS protection within the Organisation’s gateway

Target likelihood

1 – Rare

Target consequence

2 – Minor

Target risk rating

1 - Low

R09 Cyber security incident not detected

Risk overview

An intrusion is not detected leading to a threat of malicious activity and possible compromise of sensitive and or security classified data and services.

Assets affected

All infrastructure (Azure AD, Office 365, on-premises servers and endpoints)
Sensitive and or security classified data

Threat sources

Adversarial – Individual – Insider, Trusted Insider, Privileged Insider
Adversarial – Individual – Outsider
Adversarial – Group – Established
Adversarial – Nation State

Threat events

Compromise organisational information systems to facilitate exfiltration of data/information
Obtain sensitive information via exfiltration
Obtain unauthorised access to:
Deny access to Organisation information to authorised users
Modify Organisation information and making the integrity of the information unviable or no longer trustworthy
Coordinate a campaign that spreads attacks across organisational systems from existing presence

Inherent likelihood

3 – Possible

Inherent consequence

3 – Moderate

Inherent risk rating

3 – High

Ongoing and completed treatments

Native Office 365 treatments
Microsoft’s Cyber Defence Operations Centre helps protect, detect, and respond to Office 365 cloud service threats in real time
HybridSystem treatments
Microsoft Defender for Endpoint is enabled to provide reporting, pre-breach protection, post-breach detection, automation, and response on Windows 10 endpoints
Defender for Cloud Apps enabled and app connectors and policies configured to detect risky behaviours, violations, or suspicious data points and activities within Office 365
Defender for Identity monitors Active Directory authentications and performs UEBA
Microsoft 365 audit logging is enabled
All Azure AD and Office 365 logs are centralised into a single Log Analytics workspace
Credential Guard is enabled and credential theft is blocked through Microsoft Defender Exploit Guard
Attack Surface Reduction rules are enabled for Windows 10 and Office 365 in accordance with ACSC guidance
Data transfer logs are retained

Residual likelihood

1 – Rare

Residual consequence

3 – Moderate

Residual risk rating

2 – Medium

Proposed treatments

Forward logs to a SIEM solution
Organisation training for security and system administrators for the use of Security Centre
Monitoring of events within Security Centre

Target likelihood

1 – Rare

Target consequence

3 – Moderate

Target risk rating

2 – Medium

R10 Inability to recover from a data loss event

Risk overview

The failure of backup procedures leading to the inability to restore critical system components and information when data loss occurs. This risk takes into account the ISM controls relating to ‘Data backups’ that are not implemented as part of the solution.

Assets affected

All infrastructure (Azure AD, Office 365, on-premises servers and endpoints)
Sensitive and or security classified data

Threat sources

Adversarial – Individual – Insider, Trusted Insider, Privileged Insider
Adversarial – Individual – Outsider
Adversarial – Group – Established
Adversarial – Nation State

Threat events

Availability of Organisation information and systems
Cause integrity loss by polluting or corrupting critical data
Cause integrity loss by injecting false but believable data into organisational information systems
Data corruption or accidental deletion

Inherent likelihood

2 – Unlikely

Inherent consequence

2 – Minor

Inherent risk rating

2 – Medium

Ongoing and completed treatments

Organisation treatments
Ongoing operational procedures to monitor backups
HybridSystem treatments
Configuration settings of Office 365 are backed up through the As-Built As-Configured (ABAC) documentation
Documents, Desktops, Pictures on endpoints are redirected to OneDrive using Windows Known Folders providing a backup of data to the cloud
Cloud-based files have Recycle bin and Restore options
Exchange Online has a recover deleted items from server option
Retention policies will be created that ensure that 3 months of data is retained for Office 365 services
Workstation configuration is stored in Intune or Microsoft Endpoint Configuration Manager (MECM), and Standard Operating Environments (SOEs) are to be used
SOPs provided for administrators

Residual likelihood

1 – Rare

Residual consequence

2 – Minor

Residual risk rating

1 – Low

Proposed treatments

Implement an offline backup solution in the event Office 365 services are unavailable
Data backup and recovery processes and procedures are developed and regularly tested

Target likelihood

1 – Rare

Target consequence

2 – Minor

Target risk rating

1 – Low

R11 Operating system vulnerability allows exploitation

Risk overview

Security vulnerabilities are discovered within the operating system versions utilised by the solution allowing exploitation.

Assets affected

Endpoints

Threat sources

Adversarial – Individual – Insider, Trusted Insider, Privileged Insider
Adversarial – Individual – Outsider
Adversarial – Group – Established
Adversarial – Nation State

Threat events

Exploit recently discovered vulnerabilities
Exploit vulnerabilities on internal organisational information systems
Exploit vulnerabilities using zero-day attacks
Craft attacks specifically based on deployed information technology environment

Inherent likelihood

4 – Likely

Inherent consequence

3 – Moderate

Inherent risk rating

3 – High

Ongoing and completed treatments

Organisation treatments
The Organisation’s support team will monitor patching and perform manual remediation as required
HybridSystem treatments
Windows Update for Business and Microsoft Intune are enabled and configured to automatically update Windows 10 on endpoints
Multiple software update rings provide staged approach to updates
Intune or MECM can deploy firmware patches as executable files as required
Attack Surface Reduction rules are enabled for Windows 10 and Office 365 in accordance with ACSC guidance
Microsoft Defender for Endpoint provides vulnerability management capabilities to detect missing patches

Residual likelihood

2 – Unlikely

Residual consequence

3 – Moderate

Residual risk rating

2 – Medium

Proposed treatments

Forward logs to a SIEM solution
Organisation training for security and system administrators for the use of Security Centre
Monitoring of events within Security Centre

Target likelihood

2 – Unlikely

Target consequence

3 – Moderate

Target risk rating

2 – Medium

R12 Application vulnerability allows exploitation

Risk overview

Security vulnerabilities are discovered within applications utilised by the solution allowing exploitation.

Assets affected

Applications

Threat sources

Adversarial – Individual – Insider, Trusted Insider, Privileged Insider
Adversarial – Individual – Outsider
Adversarial – Group – Established
Adversarial – Nation State

Threat events

Exploit recently discovered vulnerabilities
Exploit vulnerabilities on internal organisational information systems
Exploit vulnerabilities using zero-day attacks
Craft attacks specifically based on deployed information technology environments

Inherent likelihood

4 – Likely

Inherent consequence

3 – Moderate

Inherent risk rating

3 – High

Ongoing and completed treatments

Organisation treatments
The Organisation’s support team will monitor patching and perform manual remediation as required
HybridSystem treatments
Intune or MECM used to patch applications on a regular basis
Windows Defender Firewall enabled for inbound connections
User Account Control (UAC) enabled to enforce the elevation of privileges to help prevent vulnerability exploitation
WDEG ‘exploit protection’ feature is enabled
Local administrator account renamed and disabled via Intune policy
Attack Surface Reduction rules are enabled for Windows 10 and Office 365 in accordance with ACSC guidance
Microsoft Defender for Endpoint provides vulnerability management capabilities to detect missing patches

Residual likelihood

2 – Unlikely

Residual consequence

3 – Moderate

Residual risk rating

2 – Medium

Proposed treatments

Forward logs to a SIEM solution
Organisation training for security and system administrators for the use of Security Centre
Monitoring of events within Security Centre

Target likelihood

2 – Unlikely

Target consequence

3 – Moderate

Target risk rating

2 – Medium

R13 Attacker bypasses application control capability

Risk overview

An attacker attempts to bypass the application controls enforced on endpoints.

Assets affected

Endpoints

Threat sources

Accidental – Privileged User/Administrator
Adversarial – Individual – Insider, Trusted Insider, Privileged Insider
Adversarial – Individual – Outsider
Adversarial – Group – Established
Adversarial – Nation State

Threat events

Compromise software of organisational critical information systems

Inherent likelihood

3 – Possible

Inherent consequence

3 – Moderate

Inherent risk rating

3 – High

Ongoing and completed treatments

HybridSystem treatments
WDAC provides application control functionality to block unauthorised executables from running
Microsoft recommended block rules and Microsoft recommended driver block rules implemented to prevent known WDAC bypasses
Windows Application Defender Control (WDAC) policies configured centrally from Intune or MECM
WDEG ‘exploit protection’ feature is enabled
Microsoft Defender for Endpoint is enabled to provide reporting, pre-breach protection, post-breach detection, automation, and response on Windows 10 endpoints
Attack Surface Reduction rules are enabled for Windows 10 and Office 365 in accordance with ACSC guidance

Residual likelihood

1 – Rare

Residual consequence

2 – Minor

Residual risk rating

1 – Low

Proposed treatments

Forward logs to a SIEM solution
Organisation training for security and system administrators for the use of Security Centre
Monitoring of events within Security Centre

Target likelihood

1 – Rare

Target consequence

2 – Minor

Target risk rating

1 – Low

R14 Password spray attack directed at Azure AD

Risk overview

An attacker attempts to gain access by attempting to logon using a number of different passwords against a crafted list of Azure AD accounts over a period of time.

Assets affected

All infrastructure (Azure AD, Office 365, on-premises servers and endpoints)
Sensitive and or security classified data

Threat sources

Adversarial – Individual – Insider, Trusted Insider, Privileged Insider
Adversarial – Individual – Outsider
Adversarial – Group – Established
Adversarial – Nation State

Threat events

Conduct login attempts/password guessing attacks

Inherent likelihood

3 – Possible

Inherent consequence

3 – Moderate

Inherent risk rating

3 – High

Ongoing and completed treatments

Organisation treatments
Mandatory security awareness training by the Organisation to educate users on the importance of using strong passwords or passphrases
HybridSystem treatments
Conditional Access enforces MFA for all users and administrators
Password complexity is enforced in line with ISM standards, and users are required to change passwords on first use
Azure AD Smart Lockout configured to lock out accounts for a period of time after a number of invalid attempts
Azure AD Identity Protection enabled to alert on detected User and Sign-in risks
Defender for Identity monitors Active Directory authentications and performs UEBA
PTA is used with Azure AD Connect for authentication

Residual likelihood

3 – Possible

Residual consequence

2 – Minor

Residual risk rating

2 – Medium

Proposed treatments

Organisation training for security and system administrators for the use of Security Centre
Monitoring of events within Security Centre

Target likelihood

3 – Possible

Target consequence

2 – Minor

Target risk rating

2 - Medium

R15 Lack of availability due to cloud service provider outage

Risk overview

A major outage occurs to the cloud services causing the inability to provide services to the Organisation.

Assets affected

Microsoft Azure, and Microsoft Office 365.

Threat sources

Environmental – Infrastructure Failure/Outage
Environmental – Natural or man-made disaster

Threat events

Network communications outage or contention
Interruption to cloud services
Earthquake, fire, flood, hurricane, or tornado
Force majeure

Inherent likelihood

1 – Rare

Inherent consequence

4 – Major

Inherent risk rating

2 – Medium

Ongoing and completed treatments

Native Microsoft Cloud treatments
Azure cloud services are available within multiple regions in Australia classified up to PROTECTED
Office 365 services are available within multiple regions in Australia classified up to PROTECTED. Failover of the Office 365 services will be dependent on Microsoft’s Service Level Agreement (SLA) for Office 365
HybridSystem treatments
The services utilised are available within multiple Azure regions (except any third-party solutions utilised, e.g. Organisation gateway and GovLink)

Residual likelihood

1 – Rare

Residual consequence

2 – Minor

Residual risk rating

1 – Low

Proposed treatments

None

Target likelihood

1 – Rare

Target consequence

2 – Minor

Target risk rating

1 - Low

R16 Privileged Access Workstations not implemented for administration

Risk overview

An adversary compromises privileged access mechanisms due to the lack of implementation of Privileged Access Workstations (PAWs) within the design.

Administration of the system is undertaken by authorised privileged users by connecting from a PROTECTED level endpoint to PROTECTED level services and systems.

Assets affected

All infrastructure (Azure AD, Office 365, on-premises servers, and endpoints)

Threat sources

Adversarial – Individual – Trusted Insider, Insider or Privileged Insider
Accidental – Privileged User/Administrator

Threat events

Obtain unauthorised access

Inherent likelihood

3 – Possible

Inherent consequence

3 – Moderate

Inherent risk rating

3 – High

Ongoing and completed treatments

HybridSystem treatments
Conditional Access only allows access to administrative portals from compliant Windows 10 endpoints
Hardening of Windows 10 endpoints including application control in accordance with ACSC guidance
Microsoft Defender for Endpoint is enabled to provide reporting, pre-breach protection, post-breach detection, automation, and response on Windows 10 endpoints
WDAC provides application control functionality to block unauthorised executables from running
WDEG ‘exploit protection’ feature is enabled
Conditional Access enforces MFA for all privileged users
Azure AD Identity Protection enabled to alert on detected User and Sign-in risks
Credential Guard is enabled and credential theft is blocked through Microsoft Defender Exploit Guard
Only one previous logon is cached for the Windows 10 SOE
PTA is used with Azure AD Connect for authentication

Residual likelihood

2 – Unlikely

Residual consequence

3 – Moderate

Residual risk rating

2 – Medium

Proposed treatments

Organisation system administrators to have separate administration account from their normal user account for the management of O365 and Azure.

Target likelihood

1 – Rare

Target consequence

3 – Moderate

Target risk rating

2 - Medium

R17 Mobile device compromised

Risk overview

An Apple iOS device used to access Sensitive and or security classified data is compromised. This maybe as a result of the ACSC's Security Configuration Guide – Apple iOS 14 Devices (October 2021) guidance not being fully implemented due to the usability impacts, or due to the use traditional threat events as described below.

Note, the HybridSystem does not include the use of personal iOS devices or devices using the Android operating system.

Assets affected

iOS devices
Sensitive and or security classified data

Threat sources

Adversarial – Individual – Insider, Trusted Insider, Privileged Insider
Adversarial – Individual – Outsider
Adversarial – Group – Established
Adversarial – Nation State
Unintentional – General user

Threat events

Obtain unauthorised access
Exploit recently discovered vulnerabilities, including local and Over The Air (OTA) attacks
Theft or loss of device

Inherent likelihood

3 – Possible

Inherent consequence

3 – Moderate

Inherent risk rating

3 – High

Ongoing and completed treatments

Organisation treatments
Policy governing the use and management of mobile devices used to access classified information
Awareness training for users with mobile devices
HybridSystem treatments
Implementation of the ACSC’s Security Configuration Guide for iOS 14 devices via Intune Mobile Device Management (MDM), including:
1. Supervised mode
2. Long and complex alphanumeric device passcode
3. Biometric device unlock disabled
4. Management of built-in apps (e.g., iOS Camera and Books)
5. Implementation of Intune App Protection policies
6. Application control via Apple Business Manager Enrollment and the use of Volume Purchasing Program (VPP) tokens
Conditional Access policies require iOS devices to be compliant, using applications with modern authentication and MFA
Conditional Access policies only allow access from specified countries
Conditional Access policies block sign-ins that are determined to be high risk
Intune enforces configuration policies for iOS devices including requirement for unlock code, device encryption (native iOS AES-256 encryption), minimum software version and jailbreak detection
All information transmitted to and from mobile devices and Office 365 is encrypted
Data transfer logs are retained

Residual likelihood

3 – Possible

Residual consequence

3 – Moderate

Residual risk rating

3 – High

Proposed treatments

None

Target likelihood

3 – Possible

Target consequence

3 – Moderate

Target risk rating

3 – High

R18 Use of un-assessed cloud services creates exposures

Risk overview

An administrator enables a cloud service - or new feature within an existing cloud service - for use with the HybridSystem that is not currently part of the assessed HybridSystem.

Assets affected

All cloud-based infrastructure
Sensitive and or security classified data

Threat sources

Adversarial – Individual – Insider, Trusted Insider, Privileged Insider
Accidental – Privileged User/Administrator

Threat events

Obtain unauthorised access to:
Deny access to Organisation information to authorised users
Modify Organisation information and making the integrity of the information unviable or no longer trustworthy Obfuscate adversary actions
Obtain information by opportunistically stealing or scavenging information systems/components
Compromise organisational information systems to facilitate exfiltration of data/information
Obtain sensitive and or classified information via exfiltration

Inherent likelihood

3 – Possible

Inherent consequence

3 – Moderate

Inherent risk rating

3 – High

Ongoing and completed treatments

Organisation treatments
Organisation IT Security Policy for authorised staff to not enable new cloud services or features
Approval process to obtain a privileged user account
Training to Organisation nominated system administrators
As new services become available the Organisation will undertake a risk assessment of the service and establish if the risk is within the Organisation’s tolerance before engaging the new service offering
HybridSystem treatments
Leverages built-in Azure AD / Office 365 Role Groups to implement a robust RBAC model minimising the number of users that can onboard a new service or enable additional features
Defender for Cloud Apps is configured to log activity by all users including Global Admins providing an audit trail for new services
Azure AD PIM is enabled and requires Global Admins to provide a reason when requesting elevated privileges
Azure AD PIM logs the start time and end time of elevated privileges
Data transfer logs are retained

Residual likelihood

2 – Unlikely

Residual consequence

3 – Moderate

Residual risk rating

2 – Medium

Proposed treatments

None

Target likelihood

2 – Unlikely

Target consequence

3 – Moderate

Target risk rating

2 – Medium

R19 Users declassifying emails without the owner’s permission

Risk overview

Sensitivity labels allow users to apply protective markings to emails to ensure appropriate security controls are applied to information. A user has the ability to change the protective marking without the originators permission but are required to provide a text-based justification.

Assets affected

PROTECTED data within emails (including attachments)

Threat sources

Adversarial – Individual – Insider, Trusted Insider, Privileged Insider
Accidental – User/Administrator

Threat events

Sensitive and or classified information being:
stored on the incorrect system
viewed by personnel not cleared for that security level
leaked to the general public
Obtain sensitive and or classified information via exfiltration
Invalidate the integrity and confidentiality of information

Inherent likelihood

3 – Possible

Inherent consequence

3 – Moderate

Inherent risk rating

3 – High

Ongoing and completed treatments

Organisation treatments
Training to Organisation users on the appropriate measures for applying and changing protective markings
HybridSystem treatments
The solution has been configured to require users to provide a justification for changing a label

Residual likelihood

2 – Unlikely

Residual consequence

3 – Moderate

Residual risk rating

2 – Medium

Proposed treatments

None

Target likelihood

2 – Unlikely

Target consequence

3 – Moderate

Target risk rating

2 – Medium

R20 Compromise of the Azure AD Connect database

Risk overview

An unauthorised user (malicious) gains access to the database exposing the username and email addresses used by Azure AD Connect.

Assets affected

Domain identities (not including passwords/passphrases)

Threat sources

Adversarial – Individual – Insider, Trusted Insider, Privileged Insider

Threat events

Adversary could obtain username and email addresses for user/administrator accounts being synchronised to Azure AD

Inherent likelihood

3 – Possible

Inherent consequence

2 – Minor

Inherent risk rating

2 – Medium

Ongoing and completed treatments

Organisation treatments
Leverage server-side event logging to monitor login events and network traffic.
Enable multi-factor authentication on all domain accounts
Hardening of operating systems, applications and database systems to ACSC recommended practices

Residual likelihood

4 – Unlikely

Residual consequence

2 – Minor

Residual risk rating

2 – Medium

Proposed treatments

None

Target likelihood

4 – Unlikely

Target consequence

2 – Minor

Target risk rating

2 – Medium

R21 Compromise of the SharePoint database

Risk overview

An unauthorised user (malicious) gains access to the database exposing configuration settings.

Assets affected

SharePoint Configuration settings

Threat sources

Adversarial – Individual – Insider, Trusted Insider, Privileged Insider

Threat events

Adversary could potentially modify or delete the configuration settings.

Inherent likelihood

3 – Possible

Inherent consequence

2 – Minor

Inherent risk rating

2 – Medium

Ongoing and completed treatments

Organisation treatments
Leverage server-side event logging to monitor login events and network traffic.
Enable multi-factor authentication on all domain accounts
Hardening of operating systems, applications and database systems to ACSC recommended practices

Residual likelihood

4 – Unlikely

Residual consequence

2 – Minor

Residual risk rating

2 – Medium

Proposed treatments

None

Target likelihood

4 – Unlikely

Target consequence

2 – Minor

Target risk rating

2 – Medium